The economic literature predicts that the average skill level in any industry is higher in larger cities. The existing labor sorting mechanism may also increase overconfidence of managers in financial centers if they attribute too much of their successes to their ability rather than luck. This article examines the relation between managerial ability and behavior across cities using U.S. equity mutual fund data and the Gervais and Odean (2001) model of overconfidence. Funds in financial centers on average perform better in terms of both gross and risk-adjusted returns. These funds however exhibit under-diversification and excessive trading, which is particularly high among young funds and managers and becomes detrimental for performance for high-performing funds and following bull markets. Our results suggest that financial centers attract more sophisticated, yet overconfident money managers.
The economic literature provides extensive evidence that high human capital individuals are attracted to metropolitan areas. For instance, Glaeser (1999) finds that workers in New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles are 10% more likely to be college graduates than in other U.S. cities.
Wheeler (2001) shows that increase in the size of a city increases the wage return to education and proportion of college graduates. There are two basic explanations for these findings: both assert that cities enhance workers' productivity by offering them a range of positive externalities. Some studies, including Mills (1967) and Dixit (1973) emphasize the role of scale economies in agglomeration processes. Others, such as Jacobs (1969), Glaeser, Kallal, Scheinkman, and Shleifer (1992) , Audretsch and Feldman (1996) , and Gehrig (1998) , point out that population density enables better transfer of information and knowledge spillover that enhance growth and attract those who are most likely benefit from extensive information flows.
The literature therefore predicts that for any occupation group or industry the average skill level and information flows are higher in large cities. 1 The existing sorting mechanism in the labor market where more skilled people end up working in large cities may however negatively impact managerial behavior. Gervais and Odean (2001) model an attribution bias in learning where traders attach too much of their success to their ability rather than to luck or the overall market movement. In their model, recent high performance signals ability of a trader, but because of a bias in learning, the trader attributes too much of this success to his/her own ability and becomes overconfident. With a 1 This may explain why Coval and Moskowitz (2001) find that mutual funds from U.S. metro areas, unlike funds from smaller locations, do not exhibit local biases in portfolio holdings. Fund managers in large cities may be more knowledgeable about distant assets and thus have no particular preference in investing locally. For example, an article in the Wall Street Journal (WSJ, 09/11/2002) discusses the difficulty of hiring fund managers away from financial centers stating that "...some managers insist on working in New York for professional reasons, such as wanting to tap into the broad array of company executives who pass through the city." similar learning bias, individuals may overweight the signal received from the labor market.
For instance, managers who work in New York as opposed to Wichita, Kansas, may interpret this as a proof of their ability given the evidence that higher ability workers concentrate in larger metropolitan areas. This suggests that large cities have more able but possibly more overconfident individuals.
The goal of this paper is to determine whether there are measurable differences in ability and trading behavior for fund managers working in large metropolitan areas, such as financial centers, versus other places. In economic studies, wage differentials and output per worker are often used as evidence of varying productivity and ability across workers in different regions (e.g., see Glaeser and Maré, 2001) . We compare abilities across geographic regions by looking at the output of money managers as measured by their performance and how trading influences performance rather than focusing on wage differentials. Overconfidence is measured using the predictions of Gervais and Odean (2001) where one would expect managers in financial centers to trade more and this excessive turnover should decrease over time, particularly after recent high performance. We focus on all equity mutual funds in the United States (i.e., funds that hold information-sensitive securities) that existed between 1992 and 2002. 2 In the first set of tests, we find that the turnover is higher for funds in financial centers and that it significantly decreases with fund age and especially with fund manager age. Then we condition turnover on fund performance and find that the relation between turnover and fund age is significantly negative for high-performing funds in financial centers. We also examine turnover-age relations for different market conditions and observe that the turnover of funds in financial centers is significantly higher than in other locations among young funds following strong market performance. All these findings fully support Gervais and Odean's (2001) model.
In the second set of tests, we examine performance differences between funds located in and outside of financial centers. Consistent with the arguments that larger cities attract more 2 Unlike our study, many papers have focused on either the time-series characteristics of fund returns, or crosssectional differences linking them to fund managers' characteristics. See Grinblatt and Titman (1992) , Goetzmann and Ibbotson (1994) , and Carhart (1997) as examples of mutual fund performance studies based on unconditional asset pricing models or Ferson and Schadt (1996) and Christopherson, Ferson, and Glassman (1998) as those bases on conditional models. Chevalier and Ellison (1999a,b) examine differences in the performance of funds across a range of personal characteristics of managers. skilled workers (e.g., Jacobs, 1969), we find that funds located in financial centers outperform funds located in other places in terms of gross and risk-adjusted returns, both unconditional and conditional. The difference in risk-adjusted returns is about seven basis points per month or 0.85% per year. There are no differences between these two groups of funds however in their market timing ability or trading strategies based on publicly available information. We also find some evidence that funds in financial centers are more exposed to market risk -an observation consistent with the limited portfolio holdings data showing that funds in financial centers hold less diversified portfolios.
In the last set of tests, we tie our performance findings with turnover. We find that the abnormal returns of funds in financial centers are strongly and positively related to their turnover following down markets and among low-performing funds. This implies that at least a portion of their trading is based on superior ability or some informational advantage, as found in Grinblatt and Titman (1994) . However, this advantage of funds in financial centers diminishes when their managers become more overconfident. The return-turnover relation becomes negative and statistically very significant following good markets or for highperforming funds. These results are particularly strong for New York funds.
We interpret our results as providing evidence that individuals working in financial centers are different from those working elsewhere. We support the prevailing view that larger cities have on average more productive workers, including money managers. However, the superior ability of fund managers in financial centers materializes in higher returns or more positive return to trading relation only in times when overconfidence is less likely to appear, i.e., after a period of low returns. When overconfidence level is at its highest, i.e., after a period of high returns, the performance of money managers in financial centers does not speak in favor of their superior ability. 3 We should point out that our results are completely consistent with a hypothesis of various informational spillovers that may enhance manager's ability to perform and learn. In 3 There are some studies that attempt to find differences in performance across investors depending on the size of their locations. For example, Hau (2001) finds no performance differences between traders in Frankfurt, the German financial center, and those outside that city, including locations outside Germany. This result is likely to be affected by at least two facts: first, distances in Germany are smaller than in the U.S., making it more difficult to clearly identify the financial center relative to the other areas, and, second, investors in that study are separated by political and cultural boundaries. Hau does not consider a possibility of overconfident trading in financial centers. Kumar (2004) finds evidence of overconfidence (underconfidence) among individual investors in metropolitan areas (remote locations). particular, Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subramanyam (1998) argue that investors are overconfident about their private information, rather than general public information. If managers have access to better private information in financial centers, this would be consistent with our findings. Alternatively, managers may learn from each other in an enhanced learning environment as modeled in Glaeser (1999) how information and learning may be transferred within a city as they provide evidence that fund managers in the same city hold similar portfolios and imitate each other. Hence, for the remainder of the paper we maintain a very generic definition of ability which one could interpret as the innate ability of the manager or as a manager's enhanced ability resulting from access to better (e.g., private) information or superior learning environment.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3
formulates two hypotheses about the performance differential between mutual funds located in and outside of financial centers. Section 4 presents our main findings. It starts with the analysis of the relation between turnover and fund and fund manager age. Then it presents the results of performance evaluation tests and relates these findings to turnover. Section 5 concludes.
Data
The data on equity mutual funds comes from CRSP. It contains information not only on fund returns and total net assets but also on fund's year of organization, the name of its managers, as well as its annual turnover. Our sample covers the period from January 1992 to September 2002 because turnover data is not available prior to 1992. We select all U.S. domestic equity funds that have the following investment objectives: aggressive growth, growth & income, income, and large growth.
The CRSP data does not provide the physical addresses of funds. To determine each fund's location we used in part the data from the Lipper Analytical that provides the information on where the headquarters of each fund are located. The following six cities are defined to be financial centers: Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles, New York, Philadelphia, and San Francisco. This classification corresponds to certain established criteria for identifying a financial center (see Gehrig, 1998 , and references therein). 5 We classify a fund to be in one of these financial centers if the distance of its headquarters from the city proper is no more than 50 miles. Table 1 shows the summary statistics of our mutual fund data. Panel A shows the fund distribution across locations and investment objectives. The total number of funds is 5282 resulting in 27024 fund-year observations. There are more funds in financial centers than in other places, 3016 versus 2266. New York has the largest number of funds, 1467, followed by
Boston with 615 funds. Among investment objectives, large growth funds constitute the largest proportion of all funds followed by aggressive growth funds. The panel also shows the number of fund management companies as well as the number of distinct managers for each location.
The sample contains 321 management companies out of which 156 are located in financial centers and 165 are located in other places. The number of identified distinct fund managers is 2445 in financial centers and 1966 in other places. New York has more than a thousand different fund managers over our sample period. In computing these numbers we excluded all team-managed funds.
Panel B of Table 1 shows the average fund characteristics across calendar years, such as the number of funds, fund size, fund and manager age, turnover, gross returns and expenses.
The size of the fund is measured in terms of its total net assets. The fund age is the difference in years between the current year and the year of organization of the fund. The manager age (the tenure of the manager with the fund) is the difference in years between the current year and the year when the manager was first assigned to the fund. The turnover of the fund is defined as the assets traded as a percent of the net asset size of the fund over the year. Returns are shown in basis points per month. Expenses are defined as the annual total expense ratio of the fund in percentage points. The panel shows a steady increase in the number of funds across the sample period with a slight drop in 2002. The average fund size however has not grown, except during the late 1990's. We can also observe that both fund age and fund manager age remain relatively steady over most of our sample period. The average fund age is markedly higher than the overall level only in 1992-1993. The fund turnover has substantially increased from the early 1990's. Interestingly, it remained essentially at the same level of 83-85% during the entire bull market of 1995-1999. The last three years in the sample are characterized by the average turnover close to or exceeding 100%. There are no unexpected patterns in average returns across all funds. As for the fund expenses, they too show slight increase over our sample period.
Panel C of Table 1 shows the fund characteristics across locations in and outside of financial centers. It shows the number of observations, the mean, standard deviation, median for each location, as well as the difference between locations. We can see that funds in financial centers are on average almost twice as large as those in other places and this difference is statistically very significant. There are no big differences in fund age or manager age between the two locations since the corresponding median values are exactly the same even though managers in financial centers tend to be a bit younger on average (difference is less than two months). Interestingly, the turnover in financial centers is significantly larger than in other places (92% versus 86.3%) and the same relation holds for fund returns: funds in financial centers outperform other funds by 7 basis points per month (about 85 basis points per year).
Notice that the outperformance of funds in financial centers relative to those located elsewhere is observed also in the median. At last, the average expenses of funds in financial centers are six basis points lower than those in other places, but the medians in both location groups are exactly the same. This panel thus shows that there are significant differences in turnover and returns between funds located in and outside of financial centers but these differences are unlikely to be related to fund age or manager age. In addition, knowing from previous studies that larger funds usually trade less often than small ones, the excessive turnover of funds in financial centers cannot be explained by their size.
The two hypotheses
In this section, we formulate the two competing but not mutually exclusive hypotheses about why there may be differences in managerial performance and behavior in large financial centers versus other places. If the theories of urban agglomeration are correct, we should observe more able individuals in large financial centers than elsewhere. According to two models of agglomeration (scale economies and information spillovers), higher ability in cities could reflect (i) an individual's innate skills which are better rewarded in a thick job market (e.g., see
Wheeler, 2001), and/or (ii) an enhanced learning experience due to frequent knowledge transfers in highly populated areas (e.g., see Glaeser, 1999) . We cannot distinguish between these two possible explanations for higher ability people concentrating in large cities; however, both provide the same testable hypothesis which we are interested in. In particular, one would expect that funds in financial centers provide higher returns to investors, at least, before fees and expenses. Moreover, if there is more information in financial centers then trading based on this information should enhance fund performance. 
This hypothesis implies that:
• Mutual funds in financial centers perform better than funds in other places,
• The turnover of funds in financial centers is positively related to returns.
The second hypothesis is whether the existing selection mechanism in the labor market where more skilled people choose larger and therefore wealthier cities to work and live results in overconfidence. 7 Because having a managerial job in a financial center provides a signal of ability, individuals may overweight this success and attribute too much to their skills rather than to general market conditions or luck. We test overconfidence in financial centers using the predictions of Gervais and Odean (2001) . In their model successes in trading enhance overconfidence and cause investors to trade more frequently, but, over time, investors realize their true ability and their trading decreases. Odean (1999) and Odean (2000, 2001) show that overconfidence trading lowers returns. 
• Turnover is higher in financial centers,
• Turnover of funds in financial centers is negatively related to fund and manager age,
• The relation between turnover and performance is more negative in financial centers conditional on high performance of the fund and strong markets, • Portfolio holdings are less diversified in financial centers than elsewhere.
Ability and overconfidence have opposite implications for managerial performance in financial centers. In particular, trading will erode performance for an overconfident manager, potentially negating the affects of his/her ability.
9 Therefore, the implications of the first hypothesis hold only in the absence of overconfidence or, at least, when its level is sufficiently low. This would include periods when performance of the fund is low or when the market performance is poor. 7 The link between the status (prestige) of the city and the general attitude of its inhabitants goes as far back as to The Holy Bible. In the Book of Revelation (e.g., see Commentaries of Scott, 1906), we find that self-confident people of the once wealthy ancient city of Sardis were twice the victims of their own arrogance. 8 In general, one cannot say that overconfident investors trade more than non-overconfident. Grinblatt, Titman and Wermers (1995) , Ferson and Khang (2000) and others find that fund style matters in trading patterns: value funds tend to be "contrarian," while growth funds are primarily "momentum" chasers. Thus, an overconfident value fund manager might trade less than a non-overconfident growth fund manager. However, since we compare performance of funds within the same broad category, this issue is not of concern. 9 Note that if overconfident investors have access to private signals, their profits may potentially exceed those of fully rational investors. For example, Kyle and Wang (1997) , Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subramanyam (2001) , and Thus, in this paper we test whether, consistent with economic theories of urban agglomeration, financial cities attract more skilled fund managers or whether geographic sorting in the labor market creates in large cities a pool of more able yet overconfident people.
Our tests therefore, investigate the link between the labor market geography and investor behavior and performance.
Empirical results
Our study of the behavior and performance differentials between funds located in and outside of financial centers can be divided into three general categories. The first is the analysis of turnover differentials and the relation between turnover and fund and fund manager age. The second is the evaluation of performance differentials for which we use unconditional and conditional performance evaluation models. The third is the examination of the relation between performance and turnover differentials for different fund and market performance levels.
Turnover differentials
In this sub-section, we focus on the relation between portfolio turnover and fund and manager age for funds located in and outside of financial centers. Portfolio turnover is a relatively good proxy for the frequency of trading by fund managers because it measures the minimum of total sales or total purchases made over the asset size of the fund. For instance, a fund that had 100% growth in new purchases but did not sell anything would have reported a zero turnover.
To assess the basic statistical properties of the turnover and fund age relation, we can use simple panel regression. In this regression model, the dependent variable is the log of the fund's excess turnover. The excess turnover is the ratio of the turnover of each fund in a given year over the median turnover, which is the median turnover across all funds for each year in a given fund category. The independent variables are the log age of the fund, the dummy for funds in financial centers, F, and the interaction variable composed of the log age of the fund and the financial center dummy. The results of the regression with robust standard errors are: Hirshleifer and Luo (2001) 
(1) (-8.68 ) (-0.48) (5.01) (-2.48) First, the positive and significant slope coefficient on the dummy implies that funds in financial centers have significantly higher turnover relative to other funds. Second, the negative and significant slope on the interaction term implies that funds in financial centers trade significantly more when they are young than when they are old.
It is important to find out whether the relation between turnover and fund age is unique to funds or whether it reflects a similar relation among fund managers. To assess the statistical properties of the turnover and manager age relation, we use the same panel regression approach. In the regression model, the dependent variable is the log of the fund's excess turnover. The independent variables now are the log age of the fund manager (the tenure of the manager with the fund), the dummy for funds located in financial centers, F, and the interaction variable composed of the log age of the fund manager and the financial center dummy. The results of the regression with robust standard errors are as follows: 
(-0.60) (-10.51) (5.01) (-3.23) As in model (1), model (2) yields a positive and significant slope coefficient on the financial center dummy implying that fund managers in financial centers have significantly higher turnover relative to other funds. However, the turnover-age relation is now much stronger in both economic and statistical terms than in the previous regression. First, the slope on manager age is negative and statistically highly significant, indicating that old managers trade less then young ones in locations outside financial centers. Second, the negative and significant slope on the interactive age variable implies that that old managers in financial centers trade much less frequently than the young ones relative to their peers in smaller townships.
While the statistical results in regressions (1) and (2) are useful, due to a highly nonnormal nature of the variables in those models, especially the age variable which remains very different from normal distribution even in its log form, it is important to address the above issues in a regression-free framework. Moreover, it is well known that turnover decreases with the size of the fund and so the turnover-age relation observed above may simply reflect the turnover-size relation. Figures 1 and 2 address these concerns. They show the excess turnover and size differentials (in log scale) between funds located in financial centers and those located outside depending on the fund or fund manager age. The excess size is the average difference between the size of each fund in a given year and the median fund size, which is computed for each year and fund category. We consider five fund age cohorts: 1 to 2, 3 to 5, 6 to 9, 10 to 14, and 15 plus years of age. Figure 1 gives the patterns for two relations depending on fund age.
Plot A shows the turnover-age and size-age relations for the entire sample of funds. We can see that funds in financial centers maintain a positive excess turnover differential over funds located in other places for all the age cohorts but the last one, which contains about only 10% of all observations. Since the former funds are also larger than the latter ones in every fund age cohort, it is impossible to explain the excessive trading of funds in financial centers, especially younger funds, by their smaller size. It may appear however that the overall decrease in the turnover differential with age is simply due to the observable trend for funds in financial centers to become even bigger with age relative to those located in other places.
Plot B of Figure 1 illustrates the relation between turnover and fund age for two subsamples of funds: those with high performance and those with low performance. The high (low) performing fund is a fund whose average return in a given year is greater than (less than) the median return for its fund category in that year. This analysis is motivated by Gervais and Odean's (2001) model which shows that overconfidence increases with successful investments but then decreases more rapidly with investor age, as traders start realizing their genuine ability in making investment decisions. The plot shows that the turnover-fund age relation for highperforming funds follows the model's prediction quite well. In addition, as expected, there is no convincing pattern for low-performing funds. The corresponding size-age relations show that the faster decrease in excess turnover differential among high-performing funds cannot be explained by the faster increase in their size relative to low-performing funds. In fact, we can see that the excess size differential for high-performing funds barely grows with fund age but low-performing funds in financial centers become much bigger than funds located in other places over time.
Now we turn our attention to the relation between turnover and fund manager age.
Figure 2 presents similar plots as those in Figure 1 . We can see from Plot A that funds in financial centers maintain a positive excess turnover differential over the fund located in other places across all age cohorts. It appears once more that the overall decrease in turnover differential with manager age may be because older managers in financial centers run even bigger funds than in other places relative to their young peers. However, Plot B again shows that the faster decrease in excess turnover differential among high-performing funds cannot be explained by the faster increase in their size relative to low-performing funds.
The variables that we used in the turnover-age relations above are adjusted for fund investment objective and the year of operation. However, there may be some residual impact on our findings from a relative change over time in the proportion of funds in different categories between locations in and outside of financial centers. If the proportion of funds with generally high turnover (e.g., aggressive growth funds) decreases with age more rapidly in financial centers than in other places then, one might attribute the observed decrease in excess turnover differential to such a change. Therefore, in Figure 3 we show the proportion of funds by fund investment objective for the same five fund age and manager age cohorts. Plot A gives this relation for fund age, Plot B -for manager age. In both plots we observe no clear trends that the ratio of the number of funds in financial centers over the number of funds in other places for each specific fund objective changes with the age cohort.
We conclude this sub-section with another group of tests that differentiates between fund trading behavior after poor and strong market conditions. This analysis is motivated by the insights of Gervais and Odean (2001) who argue for more overconfidence among investors after market gains and lower overconfidence after market losses. 10 Therefore, if younger funds and funds in financial centers are more overconfident, then we should be able to observe larger turnover differentials between funds located in and outside of financial centers subsequent to strong markets and, particularly among younger funds and managers.
In Table 2 we rank all the years in our sample plus 1991 based on the yearly marketwide performance and classify them into poor and strong performance years. The worst year in the sample is 2002 with the negative annual excess return of almost -23%; the best year is 1995 with the annual excess return of more than 31%. We added the year of 1991 to the table since
we will conduct our analysis on the years subsequent to the given market performance level and the first year in our sample is 1992.
10 Statman, Thorley, and Vorkink (2003) confirm this on the aggregate market data.
The test results are reported in Table 3 . It shows the differences in fund excess turnover depending on lagged market conditions: poor or strong. The turnover-age sample following poor market conditions covers the years of 1993-1995 and 2001-2002 , while that following strong market conditions covers the years of 1992 and 1996-2000. Panel A shows the excess turnover by two fund age groups: young and old. The young (old) funds are those funds whose age is less than or equal to (greater than) four -the median age across all funds. After poor market performance, the turnover difference is about 4.6%-4.7% for both young and old funds but it is statistically significant only for the latter group of funds. The situation changes quite drastically following strong market performance years. Now the excess turnover differential is 8.5% for young funds and statistically highly significant, while the same differential for old funds is economically small and insignificant.
Panel B of Table 3 shows the excess turnover by two fund manager age groups: young and old. The young (old) managers are those fund managers whose tenure with the fund is less than or equal to (greater than) two -the median tenure across all fund managers. After poor market performance, the turnover difference is about 6.7% for young funds and 3.0% for old ones but both of them are statistically insignificant. As with the fund age scenario, the situation changes dramatically following strong market performance years. The excess turnover differential increases in magnitude and becomes statistically significant for both manager age groups. For funds with young managers the difference is 7.8% and significant at the 1% level;
for funds with old managers the difference is 3.52% and significant at the 5% level. Larger turnover differentials between funds located in and outside of financial centers therefore are observed subsequent to strong markets and, especially among younger funds and funds with young managers.
Thus, the patterns of relations between fund turnover and fund age and especially manager age are fully consistent with theoretical predictions of the model of overconfident behavior in Gervais and Odean (2001) . First, funds and managers in financial centers trade more often than funds and managers located elsewhere. Second, the turnover of funds diminishes with fund and manager age and this relation is most profound for high-performing funds in financial centers. Third, the turnover difference between funds located in and outside of financial centers among younger funds and managers increases more relative to that among older funds and managers following strong market performance.
Performance differentials
Table 1 has shown that funds in financial centers outperform other funds in terms of average gross returns. Therefore, our primary attention in this sub-section is on the differences in riskadjusted returns between funds in financial centers and in other locations. We conduct two sets of tests. The first set deals with unconditional performance evaluation, the second with conditional.
Unconditional performance evaluation
We consider four unconditional performance evaluation models. The first one uses the market as the benchmark and so it can be represented as:
where i r and M r are the returns on fund i and the U.S. market portfolio less the one-month U.S.
T-bill rate, respectively. The risk-adjusted return, α, based on this model is the standard Jensen's alpha.
Model (3) does not take into account that fund managers may have different exposures not only to market risk but also to some firm-specific characteristics, such as the book-tomarket ratio and firm size, that have been shown in recent literature to be related to risk (see Fama and French, 1993, 1996) . Carhart (1997) considers one more risk measure in evaluating mutual fund performance -the momentum factor. Therefore, our second model is based on the Carhart's (1997) four-factor model, namely:
where SMB and HML are the Fama-French book-to-market and size factors, and UMD is the momentum factor. The risk-adjusted return, α, based on (4) is the Carhart's alpha.
To decompose the potential effects of stock selection ability from market timing ability we also consider two market timing models. The first model follows Treynor and Mazuy (1966) 
where γ i is market timing measure of fund i. A positive and significant γ indicates market timing ability.
The second model is based on Merton and Henriksson (1981) 
where
and is zero otherwise. The idea here is that good market timers should become more exposed to the market only when the expected market return is positive.
The test results on the performance differences in unconditional setting between funds located in financial centers and other places are shown in Table 4 . For each fund the performance results are obtained using the entire fund return history between 1992 and 2002.
The results are then averaged based on the fund's location. For each performance evaluation mode, the table shows the point estimates on all the slope coefficients, the number of observations, and the average adjusted regression R-squared. For the estimates of alphas only the table also shows the proportion of funds with a performance level within the specific critical value of the t-test. Panel A presents the results for models (3) and (4). Notice that the average alphas from both models and for both locations are negative, consistent with most of the previous studies on mutual fund performance. Both models yield also a similar difference in risk-adjusted returns: funds located in financial centers outperform funds located elsewhere and this outperformance is statistically highly significant with the spread of about 6 basis points per month or about 0.7% annually. When we look at the proportion of alphas within a given range of the t-test, we observe that there are more funds in financial centers with positive and statistically significant alphas than in other places. For example, based on the four-factor model results, the proportion of funds with positive and significant risk-adjusted returns is 3.5% in financial centers but only 1.9% in other places. When we look at the worst performers, then we can see, for instance, that the proportion of funds with negative and significant alphas is 11.0% in financial centers but 12.8% in other places. Therefore, the outperformance of funds in financial centers relative to those located elsewhere in terms of risk-adjusted returns generally holds for the entire distribution of alphas.
We observe no differences in their exposure to market risk across funds in different locations based on the single-factor model, but the four-factor model reveals that funds in financial centers take significantly more market risk: the average four-factor beta for funds in financial centers is 1.00, while the same beta for funds in other places is 0.98. Along with this, the other significant difference is found in the loadings on the book-to-market portfolio. It appears that funds in financial centers invest significantly more in value stocks than other funds. Finally, notice that the four-factor model provides a substantial improvement in the explanatory power over the one-factor model: the increase in the adjusted R-squared is about 13.5% for funds in both location groups.
Panel B presents the results for models (5) and (6). The estimates of the market timing measure from both models indicate market mis-timing across all funds, consistent with previous studies. There are no significant differences in market (mis-) timing ability across funds in different locations. The selection ability of the funds in financial centers is again higher than that of funds located in other places, although only the difference based on the Treynor and Mazuy (1966) model is statistically significant. The proportion of funds with significantly positive (negative) alphas is again higher (lower) for funds in financial centers than funds located elsewhere, similar to the estimation results from models (3) and (4). The average adjusted R-squared for both timing models are only marginally higher than those from the single-factor model, indicating that these models have very little incremental explanatory power beyond the simplest single-factor performance benchmark model.
Conditional performance evaluation
There is a very important reason to examine risk-adjusted returns in not only unconditional but also conditional setting. While any fund performance evaluation based on an alternative framework can be considered simply as a natural robustness exercise, conditional approach adds a key dimension to the interpretation of fund managers' abilities, as it pertains to his/her use of public information signals versus private signals and stock picking skills. As, Ferson and Schadt (1996) and Christopherson, Ferson, and Glassman (1998) point out, the conditional performance evaluation framework can control for possible biases in unconditional performance measures when managers trade on publicly available information. We follow these studies and present four conditional performance evaluation models. 
where, 1 − t Z is the vector of information variables available to investors at time t-1. If the outperformance of funds in financial centers is related to their time-varying risk exposure in response to changes in some economy-wide information variables, then model (7) should reflect that in terms of markedly different average B for funds in financial centers relative to those located in other places.
Our second conditional model is also based of the single-factor model (3).
11 However, in this case, not only market betas but also the intercept are represented as a linear function of the lagged information variables. The resulting model, which is called the conditional alpha and beta model, has the following form:
Model (8) ( )
, , 1 , ,
The coefficient B captures the fund manager's shifts in market risk exposure due to public information. As a result, γ now is the sensitivity of the fund's beta to the private timing signal.
Finally, the fourth and the last model is the conditional version of the Merton and 
and is zero otherwise. The coefficient ∆ captures the market timing ability of fund in response to lagged information variables. 12 If the timing ability of funds across different locations is similar we should find no significant differences not only in average γ but also in average ∆ .
Our set of information variables contains the lagged values of the one-month U.S. T-bill rate and the term spread. This choice is motivated by the recent evidence on stock returns predictability that shows that most of the commonly used instruments may have spurious relation to stock returns. It appears that the short-term interest rate and the term-structure spread have emerged as the most genuine predictors. (See Avramov, 2002; Ferson, Sarkissian, and Simin, 2003 ; and the references therein).
The test results on the performance differences in conditional setting between funds located in financial centers and other places are shown in Table 5 . As before, the test results are based on the entire return history of each fund. The format of all the reported point estimates is similar to those in Table 4 . Panel A presents the results for models (7) and (8).
Notice first of all that the average alphas from both models and for both locations are less negative than the corresponding estimates obtain within unconditional evaluation framework.
This outcome corroborates, for instance, with the evidence in Ferson and Schadt (1996) who also report that risk-adjusted performance of funds in conditional setting leads to more evidence of managerial skill than in unconditional. The second important observation is that the difference in the alphas between funds located in and outside of financial centers is now seven basis points per month (or 0.85% per year) exceeding that in unconditional setting by more than one basis point per month. This difference is statistically significant at the 1% level for both conditional beta and conditional alpha and beta models. The proportion of alphas above or below certain critical values of the t-statistic resembles that in unconditional setting.
The main message here is that the proportion of funds in financial centers with significantly positive (negative) alphas is larger (smaller) than that in other places.
When looking at the average estimates of the coefficients on the interactive market terms or the lagged values of instruments, we find no statistically significant differences between funds located in and outside of financial centers. The only marginally significant difference is observed for the slope on the interactive term composed of the lagged value of the T-bill rate and the market (in the conditional alpha and beta model). Therefore, we can state that there are no differences in response to public information between fund managers in different locations.
Thus, the out-performance of mutual funds in financial centers is a result of better stock selection ability and possibly higher risk taking (based on unconditional four-factor model).
These factors may speak in favor of genuine stock-picking skills among managers of funds in financial centers. For example, funds in financial centers may outperform funds located elsewhere because they attract fund managers with superior education and skill level (see Chevalier and Ellison, 1999a) . Alternatively, the outperformance of funds in financial centers may be due to the existence of private information there (e.g., Gehrig, 1998) . In both cases however, our findings provide evidence that fund managers in financial centers are potentially more able investors than their peers in smaller locations, supporting the predictions of agglomeration models in economics literature. Our results are also consistent with Wermers (2003) who finds that fund managers who trade more frequently (in our setting those in financial centers) have more persistent stock-picking talents. In the next section, we address all these issues by directly linking fund performance results to the frequency of trading.
Portfolio concentration differentials
In this sub-section we illustrate that differences between funds located in and outside of financial centers exist with respect to not only portfolio turnover rates but also concentration of portfolio holdings. Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2004) find that mutual funds that hold more concentrated portfolios perform on average better than funds with more diversified holdings and they attribute this superior performance to better information. In addition, Odean (1998) argues that more overconfident traders hold less diversified portfolios. If fund managers in large cities are better able, yet more overconfident, then it follows that financial center managers should also hold more concentrated portfolios.
From Lipper Analytical, we have portfolio holdings for September 1996 and we report their concentration across funds for different locations in Table 6 . The table shows that mutual funds located in financial centers hold significantly more concentrated investments than those located in other places, and this is consistent with some evidence of excessive market risk taking by managers of funds in financial centers (see Panel A of Table 4 ). The difference in portfolio concentration is the largest for the first industry, about 1.8%, and, even though somewhat diminished in economic terms, is still present for the other top five industry investments. In a recent study on individual investors data from Sweden, Goetzmann, Massa,
and Simonov (2004) also find that urban portfolios are less diversified than rural portfolios and they attribute this to broader "knowledge spillover" processes in larger cities. We find the same result holds amongst U.S. mutual fund managers.
Performance-turnover differentials
In this sub-section, we directly examine the possible informational advantage of financial centers by linking funds' turnover rates to their returns and managers' stock selection ability.
To make the full use of our annual turnover data, in this section we employ the following fund performance evaluation procedure. The risk-adjusted returns for each fund and year are computed by regressing its twelve monthly excess returns of the year on the corresponding benchmark portfolios observed during the same twelve-month period. Funds that have less than a twelve-month history for a given year are disregarded. Since fund return data in our sample is not available for the last three months of 2002, the last year for which we compute risk-adjusted returns is 2001. Furthermore, for the sake of conciseness, we use one unconditional performance evaluation model and one conditional. The unconditional riskadjusted returns are based on the Carhart's (1997) four-factor model, the conditional -on the CAPM with time-varying alphas and betas. These are the two best models in terms of their adjusted R-squared from among our two sets of four conditional and unconditional models.
Recall that in Table 3 we observed substantial differences in turnover differentials between funds located in financial centers and other places following specific market conditions. A relevant question then is whether there exist differences in returns depending on turnover level. Table 7 shows gross and risk-adjusted fund returns in financial centers and other places across high and low turnover funds as well the results of the difference test for the performance level in different locations conditional on market conditions. After poor market conditions when the overconfidence level is low, an increase in turnover, at least in part, maybe associated with some informed trading and therefore should be more beneficial for funds in financial centers where information flows are larger. More importantly, if fund managers in financial centers become more overconfident than their peers elsewhere after strong market performance, then the turnover increase in these conditions should be less beneficial for these (financial center) funds.
Panel A gives the results following poor market performance. For gross returns, we find that an increase in turnover among funds in financial centers benefits them less than funds located in smaller places. However, in terms of both unconditional and conditional riskadjusted returns, funds in financial centers gain more from larger turnover than funds in other places. For example, when moving from low to high turnover, funds in financial centers reduce their unconditional performance by 0.02 basis points a month compared to 0.17 for funds in other locations. This corresponds to a relative gain of more 0.15 basis points a month or 1.80%
annually. In the conditional setting the relative gain is smaller but still economically significant (more than 0.3% a year).
Panel B of Table 7 shows the results following strong market performance. Now the relative differences in the benefits from increased turnover across funds in different locations are consistent for both gross and risk-adjusted returns. For gross returns, we find that an increase in turnover among funds in financial centers benefits them less than funds located in smaller places, 0.23% per month and 0.31% per month, respectively. For risk adjusted returns, the performance difference becomes even bigger. High turnover adds only 0.07% in unconditional performance to funds in financial centers, yet almost three times as much, 0.18%, to fund performance in smaller locations. With conditional alphas the overall picture is similar:
the corresponding performance gains are 0.10% for funds in financial centers and 0.23% for funds in other places.
The results in Table 7 may speak in favor of more able fund managers in financial centers but, even more strongly, they point to the existence of more overconfident trading among those managers. The impact of superior skills on risk-adjusted performance is the greatest when there is less room for overconfidence, i.e., after poor market conditions. On the other hand, the potential benefits of higher ability level diminishes when the there is more overconfidence, i.e., after good market performance years.
We elaborate further on our findings in Table 7 by testing for the incremental impact of turnover of funds in financial centers on risk-adjusted returns under different market performance and fund performance levels in Tables 8 and 9 . We use only risk-adjusted returns since one should take into account the fact that funds in financial centers appear to take more risk and are less diversified (see Tables 4 and 6 ). Holding more concentrated investments in bear markets usually lead to more underperformance relative to the market as a whole and that may negate the positive effect on gross returns of more informed trading. In good market conditions, the effect is the opposite. Having more risky investment in bull markets may increase gross returns partially offsetting the negative effect of overconfident trading.
In these tests we use the following panel regression model for risk-adjusted returns, 
where t i, α is the estimated risk-adjusted return for fund i in year t. Given some evidence on the importance of changes in fund flows on fund performance (e.g., Edelen, 1999), regression (11) controls for fund flows,
Flows , , defined as the change in fund's i total net assets from year t-1 to year t. All the independent variables except for the dummy for financial centers are in the log form. Also, for each level of market or fund performance, we conduct our estimation not only on the entire available set of data but also on the sub-sample of funds from the largest financial center -New York. This allow us to examine whether any relation between turnover and returns that we might observe are common to all financial centers or are unique to the most sophisticated financial center. In the next two tables we report our results using Carhart's alphas because their properties across locations are in general qualitatively similar to conditional alphas and, from Tables 4 and 5 we observe that the four-factor unconditional performance evaluation model produces the highest adjusted R-square across all models. Table 8 shows the relation between risk-adjusted returns and excess turnover for a given market performance level. Panel A gives the results for the years following poor market performance. Regression (1) represents a reduced form of model (11) and provides the properties of the relation across all locations. In this case, similar to gross returns after bad markets, on average the excess turnover is negatively impacting performance: the slope coefficient on turnover is negative and significant. Regression (2) shows however that this relation for funds in financial centers is now significantly different from that for funds located in other places. Given the magnitude of slope coefficients on the two turnover terms, one can observe that all the negative impact from extra turnover is present only among funds located outside of financial centers. This effect strengthens in economic terms in Regression (3) when funds in New York City are compared against funds in smaller locations. Now the slope on the interactive turnover variable is positive 0.13 instead of 0.11, and it is larger in magnitude than the negative slope of 0.11 on turnover for funds located in smaller places. Regression (4) shows that while trading in New York has the most positive impact on performance, it is not limited to the largest financial center but is also present in the sub-sample of other large hubs of mutual fund industry.
If there is any informed trading in financial centers then its presence should be more observable among high-turnover funds. Therefore, the last two columns of the panel report the results of the regressions similar to (2) and (3) but using a sub-sample restricted only to funds which above median turnover for a given year and fund objective category. Consistent with the prediction of more able trading in financial centers, we indeed observe a larger positive slope on the interactive turnover term, 0.20 and 0.16 for Regression (5) and (6), respectively. These two slopes however are much smaller in magnitude than negative slopes in the corresponding regression models on the turnover variable for funds located in smaller places. Therefore, increased turnover is not beneficial in absolute terms. Table 8 presents the results for the years following strong market performance. Overall, the results are diametrically opposite to those in Panel A. Regression (1) is a reduced form model giving the properties of the relation across all locations. Now, the turnover coefficient shows that more trading has on average an enhancing effect on riskadjusted returns. However, consistent with the overconfidence hypothesis, the excess turnover is significantly less useful for financial center funds in Regression (2). Moreover, as
Panel B of
Regressions (3) and (4) shows, the detrimental impact of excessive turnover is larger in both economic and statistical terms in New Your than in other financial centers. When we consider only the funds with the above-median turnover (columns 5 and 6), the negative impact of excessive trading becomes even more profound, especially for New York. The negative slope of the interactive turnover variable in Regression (6) is larger than the corresponding one in Regression (5) and is substantially larger in magnitude than the positive slope on the turnover variable for funds outside of financial centers (-0.48 versus 0.35) . This implies that funds in New York engage in more useless trading than all other funds. At last, in Table 9 , we partition all funds on high and low-performing funds, as we did earlier and again reexamine the turnover-risk-adjusted returns relation. Panel A reports the results for low-performing funds. Note that in this case, the sign predictions are less obvious.
Low-performing funds are unlikely to be overconfident (also recall Figures 1 and 2) ; they are also not very likely to be managed by managers with superior portfolio selection skills.
Regression (1) shows that on average more trading leads to worse performance across the whole population of funds. Regression (2-4) indicate that even low-performing funds in financial centers, especially in New York, may still be better in enhancing their returns from more trading. However, the situation is opposite with the sub-sample of funds with abovemedian trading. show that these funds in financial centers have particularly poor turnover-returns relation, although it is not significant. Table 9 reports the regression results for high-performing funds, which is a more interesting case, since similar to the case of different market conditions, one can formulate clear predictions based on our ability and overconfidence hypotheses. High performance enhances overconfidence and therefore it should be detectable among funds from financial centers, in particular those from New York. As before, regression (1) reports average results. Among high-performing funds, more trading produces better risk-adjusted returns.
Regressions (2-4) shows that funds in financial centers underperform in this dimension funds located in other places, and the largest underperformance occurs in funds from New York.
Furthermore, Regressions (5-6) confirm our predictions that high turnover funds in financial centers, most notably in New York, are even more inferior to high turnover funds incorporated in smaller places.
Thus, it appears that market conditions and fund performance levels affect the turnoveralpha relation of funds in financial centers in a way consistent with the hypothesis that managers of those funds are more able but also more overconfident individuals than their peers in less prominent cities. In poor market conditions and to some extent among low-performing funds, when the overconfidence level is low, the turnover of funds in financial centers is more positively related to their returns indicating that at least part of this turnover is based on ability or useful information, possibly private. In strong markets or for high-performing funds, when the overconfidence level is high, the excessive turnover of funds in financial centers negatively impacts their returns, highlighting the damaging effect of overconfidence on performance.
These results are the particularly striking for New York funds, consistent with the expectation that funds in portfolio managers in New York maybe among some of the most sophisticated ones, yet undoubtedly more overconfident as well.
Alternative explanations
Are their alternative rational explanations for our findings? First, several papers emphasize the importance of competition among fund managers for clients and information. Dow and Gorton (1997) develop a model in which portfolio managers can trade simply to show to their clients that they are working. This would be consistent with our observation that funds located in financial centers rebalance their portfolios more frequently since they may face more rivalry than other funds. However, competition for clients does not explain other results, e.g., turnover-age and return-turnover relations, portfolio concentration differentials, etc. Coval and Moskovitz (2001) suggest that there is greater competition for local information in metropolitan areas that can adversely affect performance of funds in these places. This again leaves many of our results hard to explain. Second, Reuter (2004) finds that mutual funds that make large brokerage payments to underwriters hold a larger share of Initial Public Offerings (IPOs). Given high positive firstday returns on many IPOs in the 1990's, funds in financial centers could potentially boost their returns due to their proximity to leading underwriters. While this is consistent with their overall better performance, it still cannot explain many relations we observe, especially the results provided in Table 9 where past performance of the fund influences the turnover-return relation. Thus, rational explanations do not support for the full set of observed discrepancies in the trading behavior and performance between funds located in and outside of financial centers.
Conclusions
The urban and labor economics literature has long been arguing that large cities enhance productivity level of workers due various positive externalities, including better knowledge transfers and other information spillovers. As a result of this process, cities are believed to host people with higher average ability than small townships and this phenomenon exists in any industry with comparable presence in both metropolitan areas and smaller locations. Although previous literature has relied on testing this hypothesis using wage differentials, we provide a new test of this hypothesis using performance differentials of fund managers located in financial centers versus other places. We further postulate that the existing labor selection mechanism may induce overconfidence among managers of funds located in financial centers.
Our results support the hypothesis that fund managers in financial hubs are more able, yet overconfident individuals. On the one hand, we find that on average both gross and riskadjusted returns are higher for funds in financial centers. Also, in times when overconfidence is likely to be at the lowest, such as after down markets, the stock selection ability of funds located in financial centers is more positively related to their trading than that of funds located elsewhere, implying that some portion of their turnover is based on useful information, possibly including private.
On the other hand however, we observe that funds in financial centers trade more often and hold more concentrated portfolios than other funds. Moreover, we confirm in the data the theoretical predictions of the model of investor overconfidence developed by Gervais and Odean (2001) . We observe that the turnover of funds is negatively related to fund and fund manager age, especially for funds in financial centers. Also, conditional on the fund's performance, the relation between turnover and age is significantly more negative for highperforming funds in financial centers. We further show that, consistent with the prediction of the model, the impact of overconfidence on fund performance is most profound among highperforming funds, and in the years following strong market. Funds in New York exhibit more overconfidence than all other funds, including those in the secondary financial centers.
Thus, we document that geographic location of a fund has an important impact on fund manager's behavior and that it can have both positive and negative effects on fund performance. The positive effect is related to the fact that financial centers may enhance the stock picking ability of fund managers and their trading skills. The negative effect is associated with overconfidence that is present more in financial centers due to the very perception that on average these locations attract more able people.
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Audretsch, D.B., and M.P. Feldman, 1996, Knowledge spillovers and the geography of innovation and production, American Economic Review 86, 630-640. IN, and large growth, LG. The panel also shows the number of management companies and the number of different fund managers. Panel B gives the summary of average fund characteristics across calendar time. Panel C provides more detailed information on fund characteristics across two locations -financial centers, F, and other places, O. Panel D gives the details on turnover and gross returns by fund investment objective. The fund is considered to be in a financial center if its headquarters are located within 50 miles of one of the six cities defined as financial centers. The size of the fund is measured in terms of its total net assets. Flow is the log annual change in the fund's size. The fund age is the difference in years between the current year and the year of organization of the fund. The manager age (the tenure of the manager with the fund) is the difference in years between the current year and the year when the manager was first assigned to the fund. Manager age excludes all team-managed funds. The turnover is the annual turnover of the fund. The returns are average returns for each year and fund and are shown in basis points per month. The expenses are the annual total expenses of the fund in percentage points. Table 3 Turnover and fund and manager age for a given market performance level The table shows the differences in fund excess turnover depending on lagged market conditions: poor or strong. The excess turnover is the average difference between the turnover of each fund in a given year and the median turnover. The median turnover for each fund is the median turnover of funds for each year and fund category. The turnover and age samples cover the period from 1992 to 2002. The poor market performance is observed in the following years : 1992-1994 and 2000-2002 . The strong market performance is observed in 1991 and 1995-1999. The turnover-age sample following poor market conditions covers the years of 1993-1995 and 2001-2002 , while that following strong market conditions covers the years of 1992 and 1996-2000. Panel A shows the turnover by two fund age groups: young and old. The young (old) funds are those funds whose age is less than or equal to (greater than) four -the median age across all funds. Panel B shows the turnover by two fund manager age groups: young and old. The young (old) managers are those fund managers whose tenure with the fund is less than or equal to (greater than) two -the median tenure across all fund managers. The table also shows the number of observations, the results of the difference test for the turnover in different locations, as well as the difference between excess turnover differentials under different market conditions. Table 7  Fund returns for a given market performance  The table shows gross Table 8 Relation between risk-adjusted returns and excess turnover for a given market performance level This table shows the estimation results from the panel regression of risk-adjusted fund returns on excess turnover and location for different market conditions while controlling for fund size. The excess turnover is the average difference between the turnover of each fund in a given year and the median turnover. The median turnover for each fund is the median turnover of funds for each year and fund category. The unconditional risk-adjusted returns are based on the Carhart's (1997) four-factor model, the conditional -on the CAPM with time-varying alphas and betas. The risk-adjusted returns for each fund and year are computed by regressing its twelve monthly excess returns of the year on the corresponding benchmark portfolios observed during the same twelve-month period. Funds that have less than a twelve-month history for a given year are disregarded. The regression model has the following form: Flows , are the fund's i log excess turnover, log size, and flows, respectively. Panel A gives the results for the years in which the turnover followed poor market performance, Panel B -for strong market performance. F denotes the finance center dummy, and NY -for the city of New York. The sample of risk-adjusted returns covers the period from 1992 to 2001.
Panel A: Following poor market performance (1993) (1994) (1995) 2001) (1) All (2) Table 9 Relation between risk-adjusted returns and excess turnover for a given fund performance level This table shows the estimation results from the panel regression of risk-adjusted fund returns on lagged turnover and location for high and low-performing funds while controlling for fund size. The high (low) performing fund is a fund whose average return in a given year is greater than (less than) the median return for its fund category in that year. Only the unconditional risk-adjusted returns based on the Carhart's (1997) four-factor model are considered. The risk-adjusted returns for each fund and year are computed by regressing its twelve monthly excess returns of the year on the corresponding benchmark portfolios observed during the same twelve-month period. Funds that have less than a twelve-month history for a given year are disregarded. The regression model has the following form: Figure 1 . Relation between excess turnover and size differentials and fund age. The figure shows the excess turnover and size differentials (in log scale) between funds located in financial centers and those located outside depending on the fund age. The excess turnover is the average difference between the turnover of each fund in a given year and the median turnover, which is computed for each year and fund category. The excess size is the average difference between the size of each fund in a given year and the median fund size, which is computed for each year and fund category. The size of the fund is measured in terms of its total net assets. The fund age is the difference in years between the current year and the year of organization of the fund. Plot A depicts the two relations across all funds; Plot B -separately for high and low-performing funds. The high (low) performing fund is a fund whose average return in a given year is greater than (less than) the median return for its fund category in that year. . Relation between excess turnover and size differentials and manager age. The figure shows the excess turnover and size differentials (in log scale) between funds located in financial centers and those located outside depending on the manager age. The excess turnover is the average difference between the turnover of each fund in a given year and the median turnover, which is computed for each year and fund category. The excess size is the average difference between the size of each fund in a given year and the median fund size, which is computed for each year and fund category. The size of the fund is measured in terms of its total net assets. The manager age is the difference in years between the current year and the year when the manager was first assigned to the fund. Plot A depicts the two relations across all funds; Plot B -separately for high and low-performing funds. The high (low) performing fund is a fund whose average return in a given year is greater than (less than) the median return for its fund category in that year. 
